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Abstract
We consider a setting in which two potential merger partners each possess
private information pertaining both to the profitability of the merged entity
and to stand-alone profits, and investigate the extent to which this private
information makes ex-post regret an unavoidable phenomenon in merger ne-
gotiations. To this end, we consider ex-post mechanisms, which use both
players’ reports to determine whether or not a merger will take place and
what each player will earn in each case. When the outside option of at least
one player is known, the efficient merger decision can be implemented by such
a mechanism under plausible budget-balance requirements. When neither
outside option is known, we show that the potential for regret-free implemen-
tation is much more limited, unless the budget balance condition is relaxed
to permit money-burning in the case of false reports.
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1 INTRODUCTION 2
1 Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions occur frequently in the corporate landscape. Nevertheless,
it appears that often at least one party regrets the outcome of the transaction
with the benefit of hindsight. Famous examples include the mergers of BMW and
Rover, AOL and Time-Warner, or Mattel and The Learning Company, to name
only a few. In many of these examples, the value of the new entity turns out to
be lower than the combined value of its parts; in other cases, the owners of one of
the firms lose out, as reflected in the well-known result that acquirers often overpay
for the target (Andrade et al., 2001). Given the tremendous stakes in many merger
decisions and the correspondingly large opportunity cost from accepting a merger at
conditions that turn out to be unfavorable ex-post, it seems natural to ask whether
such problems are inevitable.
A popular explanation for regret in merger transactions are internal agency con-
flicts as, for instance, self-interested managers engage in unprofitable mergers to ex-
pand their empire. More basically, regret in merger transactions may simply result
from bad luck in situations of symmetric uncertainty : Mergers that are profitable in
expectation may turn out to be unprofitable in the event of bad states. Symmetric
uncertainty may include a wide range of different phenomena. For instance, the gen-
eral economic downturn following September 11th 2001 has often been mentioned
as a reason why some mergers that took place immediately before the attacks have
not been successful. Less spectacularly, uncertainty about the future prospects of
an industry can often lead to mistaken merger decisions.
However, there are clearly important cases of merger failure that cannot be traced
back to symmetric uncertainty, but rather to asymmetric information between po-
tential merger partners. For instance, it was only after the acquisition of CUC
International, a marketer of discount membership clubs, that the investment banker
Henry Silverman, owner of the hotel chain HFS, discovered that CUC had dramat-
ically overstated its revenues. The revelation of this information after the merger
led to a massive drop in the stock market value of the new firm Cendant (Business
Week, 2000). Similarly, in the merger between the German banks Bayerische Vere-
insbank and Hypobank , the former was unaware that the partner’s “balance sheet
contained a time-bomb” until two years after the merger (The Economist, 2000).
Finally, environmental liabilities which may well be known to takeover targets lead
to huge costs for the acquirer, for instance, in the energy industry (Brown et al.,
2005). Beyond these drastic examples of partners concealing relevant information,
quite generally parties often lack precise information on important characteristics of
the potential partner, his productivity, corporate culture, etc.
Starting from these observations, our paper investigates the misalignment of
interests between merging parties as a basic source of regret over merger decisions.
To isolate this issue, we deliberately choose our assumptions so that neither internal
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agency conflicts nor symmetric uncertainty can play a role: We consider situations
where ownership and control in each firm coincide, and where any information that
is relevant to the merger decision is present with at least one of the two firms.
However, we let parties possess different pieces of this information. We then ask: Is
it possible to structure the merger negotiations and the decision process in a fashion
such that no party regrets its behavior afterwards?
To illustrate our setting, consider the following two examples. First, suppose
two firms are privately informed about their own (future) productivity. Typically,
both a firm’s stand-alone profits and the post-merger profits of an entity to which it
belongs should be higher for more productive types. Moreover, if firms compete in
the same market, each firm’s productivity will usually have a negative impact on the
competitor’s stand-alone profits. As a second example, suppose two firms have been
competing in a stable market environment over an extended period of time. Then,
they may be expected to be reasonably well informed about those characteristics of
the competitor that pertain to their stand-alone performance. However, they may
have very limited knowledge about how they would fit together in the event of a
merger, that is, how well the organizational cultures match. Thus, one might still
expect substantial private information concerning post-merger profits, whereas—
in contrast to the previous example—firms’ outside options are common knowledge.
This difference between the two examples (i.e., whether outside options are common
knowledge or not) will turn out to be crucial to whether regret is avoidable.
In the setting described, merger negotiations have the function of assembling
the privately held information, reaching a (preferably efficient) merger decision, and
determining how profits are to be split among parties in the event of a merger.
Using a mechanism-design approach, we formalize this negotiation process in terms
of merger mechanisms, where agents (simultaneously) report their information (i.e.,
their ‘type’), and each of the above decisions is made contingent on these reports.
Motivated by the question at hand, we restrict attention to merger mechanisms
which result in no ex-post regret, that is, mechanisms such that truthful reporting is
optimal for each party given any type of the other party and given truthful reporting
on the other party’s behalf. In addition, we impose natural budget-balance and
individual-rationality conditions. By the former, agents’ payoffs must sum to jointly
realized profits for any outcome of the mechanism. By the latter, agents must receive
at least their stand-alone profit for any equilibrium outcome of the mechanism.
We derive our first result for settings in which parties possess private information
concerning the value of a merger, but where (at least) one party’s stand-alone profits
are commonly known. We show that a simple mechanism where, in the event of a
merger, the party with commonly known outside options is bought out by the other
firm achieves efficient implementation, that is, mergers take place if and only if they
increase joint profits.
In the remainder of the paper, however, we show that the scope for extending
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this positive result to more general settings is extremely limited: For a large class
of settings, not only is implementation of the efficient merger decision impossi-
ble, but only very trivial merger decision functions can avoid ex-post regret at all.
Specifically, we derive this result for settings such that both players’ stand-alone
profits depend positively on own types, but non-positively on the competitor’s type,
whereas the payoffs of the merged firm depend positively on both types. This neg-
ative result then suggests that internal agency conflicts and symmetric uncertainty
may not be the only reasons for regret over merger transactions: Even when merger
parties possess all relevant information and there are no internal agency conflicts, it
is often simply impossible to structure negotiations to avoid ex-post regret.
An important ingredient to this result is the aforementioned notion of budget
balance, by which the mechanism must balance also off equilibrium, that is, if agents
misreport their type. This property creates a problem of separating type profiles
with identical merger profits, so that agents’ equilibrium payoffs cannot differ be-
tween such type profiles. Intuitively, on the one hand, as payoffs can be conditioned
on actual types only through total merger profits, agents cannot be punished se-
lectively in the event that observed joint mergers are inconsistent with individual
reports. On the other hand, budget balance prohibits collective punishment as it
requires that merger profits are fully distributed to the merging parties.
This latter point leads us to ask whether the scope for implementation can be
improved upon by allowing money to be burnt in the event of off-equilibrium re-
ports. It turns out that, in this case, the efficient merger decision can always be
reached in a regret-free and individually rational way. The practical relevance of this
result hinges, however, on arguably strong assumptions concerning agents’ ability
to commit, or the existence of a third-party mediator such as a merchant bank.
From a mechanism-design perspective, the problem considered in this paper has
several distinguishing features. First, parties’ payments are conditionable on ex-post
information: A merger mechanism must not only produce a merger decision, but
also prescribe how joint profits are to be shared in the event of a merger. In the
simplest case, this can be done by allocating fixed profit-shares in a merged entity.
More sophisticated financial arrangements allow conditioning agents’ payoffs on re-
ported types and realized merger profits in an essentially arbitrary manner.1 As has
previously been noted, this ‘contingent-payment’ feature gives the mechanism de-
signer additional degrees of freedom.2 Second, the problem displays interdependent
valuations in that agents’ preferences over outcomes depend on each other’s type.
1Practical examples include collars (Officer, 2004), which use changes in stock prices to deter-
mine the partners’ remuneration, and contingent value rights (Hietala et al., 2003), where sellers
obtain put options on the shares of the new entity.
2Hansen (1985) (see also Cre´mer, 1987) and Riley (1988) show that, in an auction setting, con-
ditioning payments on ex-post information allows the auctioneer to improve his expected revenues.
Mezzetti (2004) demonstrates in a more general setting that the use of ex-post information on
payoffs can aid implementation of efficient decision rules.
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Third, requiring that merger negotiations always result in a budget-balanced out-
come is natural, as there is no obvious candidate for a third-party residual claimant.
Fourth and finally, as noted above, we require the mechanism to be regret-free.3
Eventually, the combination of these features makes it impossible to directly relate
our problem to the previous mechanism-design literature.4
This becomes compellingly transparent by contrasting our results to the classical
problem of bilateral trade under asymmetric information. For instance, Myerson
and Satterthwaite (1983) show that, under fairly general conditions, there exists no
ex-post efficient, individually rational Bayesian trading mechanism for indivisible
goods. In contrast, it is a simple corollary of our positive result that once it is
possible to condition payoffs on the realized value of trade—a very natural feature
in a merger setting but perhaps unrealistic in most classical trade problems—then
there in fact exists an efficient, budget-balanced, individually rational and regret-
free trading mechanism. That our paper nevertheless arrives at largely negative
results is caused by a further distinguishing feature of our merger setting: While
the classical trade problem posits a publicly known outside option for the buyer (i.e.,
his utility if no trade occurs), it is natural in many merger settings to assume that
both parties’ outside options are subject to private information.
In a more immediately related paper, Brusco et al. (2005) also investigate the role
of asymmetric information in merger negotiations. In contrast to our paper, they
search for efficient (Bayesian) rather than regret-free mechanisms. Differences in
the set-up aside,5 our findings complement each other by revealing a strong overlap
in the attainability of these two goals: First, both papers show that when private
knowledge does not pertain to outside options, both efficiency and regret-freeness
3More generally, one may want to consider Bayesian-Nash implementation, that is, merger
mechanisms such that truth-telling is optimal in expected terms, with expectations taken over
the other party’s possible types. Our restriction to regret-free mechanisms is immediately driven
by the question at hand. Nonetheless, we should note that the recent literature provides several
independent arguments for this restriction based on robustness concerns. Specifically, these concern
the robustness of Bayesian mechanisms to players’ having incorrect beliefs about types and other
players’ beliefs (see Bergemann and Morris, 2005, Chung and Ely, 2003, and the survey in Jehiel
et al., 2006), as well as concerns about the necessity of simultaneous information revelation in
Bayesian Mechanisms and the related problem of espionage (see Miller, 2005).
4For instance, Jehiel et al. (2006) show that non-trivial regret-free implementation is possible
only for a very small, degenerate set of mechanism design problems with multivariate private in-
formation and interdependent valuations. On the other hand, there are many instances not only
of non-trivial, but of efficient regret-free implementation in more specific settings with interdepen-
dent valuations and univariate private information, particularly in the context of auctions (see, for
instance, Cre´mer and McLean, 1985; Maskin, 1992; Dasgupta and Maskin, 2000; Eso˝ and Maskin,
2000; Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001; Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki, 2002; Perry and Reny, 2002; Krishna,
2003; Ausubel, 2004). While non of these settings impose any budget-balance requirements, they
also lack the contingent-payment feature of our problem, rendering direct comparisons impossible.
5On the one hand, Brusco et al.’s set-up allows merger negotiations taking place with more than
one potential partner. On the other hand, their setting is more restrictive regarding the structure
imposed on profit functions’ dependence on private information.
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are attainable. Second, for a large class of remaining settings, our papers combine
to show that neither goal is attainable.
Interestingly, there has recently been quite some investigation into the efficient
dissolution of partnerships under interdependent valuations, which in some ways
represents the inverse to the problem considered in this paper. This literature works
out conditions under which it is possible to efficiently dissolve joint ownership of a
firm when valuations for that firm differ and are privately known.6 In contrast
to our paper, whether it is efficient to dissolve or not is generally not an issue:
The social value of the partnership is simply the share-weighted average of agents’
individual valuations, so dissolution will be efficient whenever agents’ valuations
differ. Rather, the question is only one of allocating the single indivisible item owned
by the partnership to the agent with the highest valuation. Thus, the problem
is strongly related to auction design, with some additional difficulties caused by
budget-balance requirements. In our setting, on the other hand, the main question
is whether the partnership should be formed or not. In contrast, how shares in the
partnership are to be allocated in the event of a merger does not affect efficiency, as
agents have pure common valuations concerning the partnership itself.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model, describ-
ing both the merger environment and the mechanisms to be considered. Section 3
shows that if at least one party’s outside option is common knowledge, efficient
implementation is possible. Section 4 presents this paper’s main result by show-
ing that, for more generic environments, not only efficient but in fact any kind of
non-trivial implementation is impossible. Providing a closer look at budget balance,
Section 5 shows that the possibility of “burning money” off equilibrium reverses the
largely negative results of Sections 4. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
This section presents the basis for our analysis of merger negotiations. Section 2.1
introduces the general setup and basic terminology. We motivate our framework
with specific examples in Section 2.2.
2.1 Merger Environment and Mechanism
We consider merger mechanisms in an environment of the following type:
Definition 2.1. A merger environment E is a tuple (T1, T2, π1, π2, πM) with the
following components:
(i) Ti = [0, 1], i = 1, 2, is the type space for firm i;
6See Fieseler et al. (2003), Jehiel and Pauzner (2006), Ornelas and Turner (2004) and the survey
in Moldovanu (2002).
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(ii) πi : T1 × T2 → IR+ is the stand-alone profit function for firm i;
(iii) πM : T1 × T2 → IR+ is the merger profit function.
Thus, an environment is essentially a description of how well each of two parties
would do on their own and what they could achieve together, taking account of the
fact that each of these quantities can depend on each party’s private information,
where private information is represented by the joint type-space T ≡ T1×T2. Agents
each know their own type ti ex-ante, but observe realized profits (πi if no merger
occurs, πM a merger occurs) only after the negotiation. For convenience, we will
assume that π1, π2 and π
M are continuous.7
The dependence of (stand-alone) profit functions on information held by the
other firm is a very natural feature of an oligopolistic environment. We should
point out in advance, however, that none of our ensuing results depend on this (i.e.,
all results are valid also for ∂
∂tj
πi ≡ 0).
For an environment as described in Definition 2.1, we investigate mechanisms
which use a system of transfers and—provided a merger occurs—allocations of the
merged entity’s profits. Anticipating the usual revelation argument, we restrict our
attention to direct merger mechanisms, for which each agent’s report is restricted
to his type space:8
Definition 2.2. A (direct) merger mechanism M is a tuple (m, πˆM, p0) consisting
of a merger decision function m, merger-profit sharing rules πˆM = (πˆM1 , πˆ
M
2 ), and
transfer functions p0 = (p01, p
0
2), which are defined as follows:
(i) The merger decision function m : T → {0, 1} maps a combination of reports
t˜ = (t˜1, t˜2) by players 1 and 2 about their type into a merger decision, with
m(t˜) = 1 if and only if the merger takes place as a result of the reports. We
let M0 ≡ m−1(0) and M1 ≡ m−1(1).
(ii) The transfer functions p0i : M
0 → IR, i ∈ {1, 2}, specify a transfer payment
from player i to the mechanism operator for any reported types t˜ ∈ M0.
(iii) The merger-profit sharing rules πˆMi : M
1 × IR+ → IR, i ∈ {1, 2}, map reports
t˜ ∈ M1 and realized merger profits πM(t) into a payoff to firm i.
7Moreover, note that the above definition assumes that each agent’s private information is
univariate. Given the largely negative results concerning efficient implementation under interde-
pendent valuations with multi-dimensional as opposed to univariate information in auction set-
tings (Jehiel and Moldovanu, 2001) and in more general settings (Jehiel et al., 2006), scalar-valued
information should improve the scope for efficient implementation in our merger setting.
8Importantly, we assume that the merger decision does not reveal any information that influ-
ences the strategic interaction between the two parties after the merger. Otherwise the merger
process would display what Jehiel and Moldovanu (2006) call ‘informational externalities’ on the
ensuing interaction, and the revelation principle will no longer apply. Hviid and Prendergast (1993)
investigate such informational externalities in the context of mergers with one-sided asymmetric
information.
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Thus, a merger mechanism’s merger decision m produces a partition of type space
T into type profiles M0 such that no merger occurs (the ‘no-merger set’) and type
profiles M1 such that a merger occurs (the ‘merger set’). For simplicity, we consider
only merger mechanisms that are well-behaved in the sense that (i) the boundary
between M0 and M1 is almost everywhere smooth, and (ii) for every t ∈ M1 and
every ε-neighborhood Uε(t), there exists a point t
′ ∈ Uε(t) in the interior of M1.9
Letting ui(t˜; t) denote agent i’s payoffs for any combination of reported and true
types t˜, t ∈ T,
ui(t˜; t) =
{
πi(t)− p0i (t˜), if t˜ ∈ M0,
πˆMi [t˜;π
M(t)], if t˜ ∈ M1. (1)
In the simplest case, agents’ payoffs over M1, πˆMi (·), may be thought of as arising
through (report-dependent) allocations of shares in the merged entity and accompa-
nying payments. More generally, the use of more sophisticated securities will permit
an arbitrary conditioning of payoffs on reports and true post-merger profits.10
For reasons given in the introduction, we shall confine ourselves to finding ex-
post implementable mechanisms, that is, mechanisms for which truthful reporting
is a best response to any given type of the competitor, given truthful reporting by
the other type. Formally, letting Ui(t˜i; ti, tj) = ui(t˜i, tj; ti, tj) denote firm i’s payoff
given truthful reporting by the other firm, the requirement of ex-post incentive
compatibility can be compactly formulated as follows:
Definition 2.3. A merger mechanism M is (ex-post) incentive compatible (IC) if
Ui(ti; ti, tj)  Ui(t˜i; ti, tj), for all i ∈ {1, 2}, t˜i, ti ∈ Ti, tj ∈ Tj. (2)
We shall call a merger decision function m implementable if there exist πˆM and
p0 such that the mechanism (m, πˆM, p0) is incentive compatible.
Efficiency of a merger decision function is defined as follows:
Definition 2.4. A merger decision function m is efficient if, for all t ∈ T,
m(t) =
{
0, if πM(t) < π1(t) + π2(t),
1, if πM(t) > π1(t) + π2(t).
(3)
We call a merger mechanismM = (m, πˆM, p0) efficient if and only if m is efficient.
Since it is natural to assume that no third party should benefit from or subsidize
the mechanism, we introduce the following condition:
9This will, for instance, exclude merger sets that contain isolated lines or isolated points.
10Observe that the transfer function p0i is only defined over M
0 since over M1, transfers (i.e., com-
ponents of the payoff that are independent of the realized level of πM) may be included w.l.o.g. in
the merger-profit sharing rule πˆM.
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Definition 2.5. A merger mechanism is budget balanced (BB) if, for all t˜, t ∈ T,
u1(t˜; t) + u2(t˜; t) =
{
π1(t) + π2(t), if t˜ ∈ M0,
πM(t), if t˜ ∈ M1. (4)
Importantly, this budget balance condition is required to hold not only for truth-
ful reports.11
Finally, letting Vi(ti, tj) ≡ Ui(ti; ti, tj) denote agent i’s equilibrium payoff function
(or value function), mechanisms in which agents will voluntarily participate must
satisfy the following requirement:
Definition 2.6. A merger mechanism is individually rational (IR) if
Vi(t)  πi(t), for all i ∈ {1, 2}, t ∈ T. (5)
Consistent with our notion of ex-post incentive compatibility, note that (IR)
requires ex-post rationality in that agents’ equilibrium payoffs must exceed their
outside option for any possible type of the other player (rather than merely in
expectation).
Finally, observe that there is one particular mechanism which—albeit typically
being highly inefficient—satisfies all remaining constraints, namely the mechanism
which reproduces the status quo by prescribing (i) never merge, and (ii) always
require zero payments. Such a mechanism satisfies (IC), (BB), and (IR).
2.2 Examples of Merger Environments
We illustrate our set-up with a few exemplary merger environments. The examples
offer different instances of what the relevant private information t1, t2 consists in
and, correspondingly, how it relates to stand-alone and post-merger profits.
Example 1 (Synergy Potentials). Suppose each firm holds private information
which concerns the synergy potentials in the event of a merger, but which is rele-
vant to neither firm’s stand-alone operations, so that outside options are commonly
known. This information may relate to the ease with which each firm’s production
equipment, its workforce, or its organizational structure (including sales operations,
etc.) can be integrated into a joint entity. More generally, it may relate to the
profitability of some new business venture which is feasible only to a merged entity.
If a higher value of ti signals higher synergy potentials, efficiency requires that some
set of types above a downward-sloping line engages in a merger, as illustrated in
panel (1) of Figure 1.
11Such a condition has typically been invoked also in the aforementioned literature on partnership
dissolution (cf. Jehiel and Pauzner, 2006; Ornelas and Turner, 2004).
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0 1 t1
0
1
t2
M0
M1
(1) Synergy Potentials
0 1 t1
0
1
t2
M1
M0
M0
(2) Corporate Culture
0 1 t1
0
1
t2
M0
M1
M1
(3) Rationalization Mergers
0 1 t1
0
1
t2
M1
M0
M0
(4) Mergers with Complementary
Technologies
Figure 1: Efficient Merger Decisions for Examples of Section 2.2.
Example 2 (Corporate Culture). As in the first example, suppose firms’ private
information is only relevant to post-merger profits. Suppose, however, that post-
merger profits depend positively only on how similar firms’ privately known types
are. For instance, types could represent different patterns of corporate culture, all
of which perform equally well in autarky, but where merging more dissimilar ones
involves larger frictional losses.12 Then the efficient set will typically contain points
sufficiently close to the diagonal, as in panel (2) of Figure 1.
Examples 1 and 2 above have both assumed private information to be relevant
only in the event of a merger. However, if a firm’s private information concerns
factors such as production costs, workforce quality, financial health, demand fore-
casts, etc., this information will typically be relevant both to profits in the event
of a merger and to the firm’s stand-alone profits if no merger occurs. Moreover,
provided some form of interaction between the firms—such as if firms operate on
related markets—each firm’s private information is relevant also to the competitor’s
12Many case studies attribute failed mergers to incompatible corporate cultures of the merging
firms; see Larsson and Finkelstein (1999).
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profit if no merger occurs. Adding mild further conditions on the direction in which
information affects each profit function, we shall call such a merger environment
‘competitive:’
Definition 2.7. A merger environment is competitive if (i) ∂πi/∂ti > 0, (ii) ∂πi/∂tj 
0, and (iii) ∂πM/∂ti > 0 for all i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i = j.
Thus, in a competitive merger environment, any good news held by a firm con-
cerning its stand-alone profits translates into good news concerning the prospects
of a merged firm, but will be (weakly) detrimental to the competitor if no merger
occurs. In spite of this common structure, competitive merger environments can
still produce very different efficient merger decisions, as the following two examples
illustrate:
Example 3 (Rationalization Mergers). Consider a competitive merger environ-
ment in which a firm’s private information concerns its technological know-how. If
this know-how is easily transferrable to the technologically inferior firm’s produc-
tion process in the event of a merger, then merging will typically be more efficient
for more unequal types, where this ‘rationalization-effect’ is strongest. Hence, the
efficient set will typically consist of points away from the diagonal, as in panel (3)
of Figure 1.
Example 4 (Mergers with Complementary Technologies). Assume next that,
in contrast to Example 3, the more efficient firm’s advantage is only imperfectly
transferrable in the event of a merger (such as if its advantage derives, for instance,
from a better-trained workforce). At the extreme, if the inferior firm’s technology
is decisive to the merged entity’s profitability, which may happen when the assets
brought into the relationship are highly complementary, merging will typically be
more efficient when the difference in firms’ efficiency levels is small, so that the
efficiency loss incurred by the more efficient firm is small. As illustrated in panel (4)
of Figure 1, qualitatively, the efficient merger decision will correspond to the inverse
of that under rationalization. Finally, scenarios in between these two polar cases
will produce essentially arbitrary other partitions of the type-space.
3 Implementation with a Known Outside Option
In this section, we restrict attention to environments where the outside option of
at least one player is commonly known. Clearly, this setting contains Examples 1
and 2 of the last section as special cases, where both outside options were commonly
known. The main result shows that efficient implementation is possible in such a
setting:
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Proposition 3.1. If the merger environment is such that neither agent holds any
private information on some agent j’s stand-alone profits, so πj is constant in t
for some j ∈ {1, 2}, then any efficient merger decision can be implemented by a
mechanism satisfying (BB) and (IR) by agent i = j obtaining the full merger profits
in the event of a merger and paying πj to agent j, and zero transfers if no merger
occurs.
Under such a mechanism, agent j will always obtain his stand-alone profit no
matter what signal he sends, so that truth-telling will always be weakly optimal.
Concerning agent i, observe that transfers and shares are unaffected by any devi-
ations which leave the merger decision unaffected, so that we only need to show
incentive compatibility for deviations which affect the merger decision. Given any t,
agent i’s payoff will be πM(t)−πj from merging, and πi(t) from not merging. Hence,
agent i’s gains to merging are πM(t)−πi(t)−πj, which will be positive for any type
constellation such that merging is efficient, and negative for any type constellation
such that merging is inefficient. Therefore, given efficiency of the merger decision
function m, a type such that merging is efficient (given the other type) will lose by
deviating from truth-telling, and so will a type such that no merger occurs. It is
easily seen that the described mechanism satisfies (BB) and (IR).
Intuitively, the mechanism employed in Proposition 3.1 makes the party whose
outside option is private knowledge the residual claimant, thereby perfectly aligning
this party’s incentives with the goal of efficiency. The other party in turn will obtain
a payoff equal to its known stand-alone profit irrespective of reports (and merger
decision), and will therefore have no incentive to misreport.13
A trivial corollary of Proposition 3.1 is that implementation of the efficient
merger decision is also possible if both agents’ stand-alone profits are common knowl-
edge, that is, if each agent’s private information pertains only to profits under a
merger.14 Thus, both the ‘Synergy Potentials’- and ‘Corporate Culture’-examples
discussed in Section 2.2 permit implementation of the efficient decision.
In light of this result, it may appear puzzling that many mergers appear to
turn sour because of rows over corporate culture. There are two possible responses.
First, in many cases, the problems of integrating the cultures of two companies
may have less to do with asymmetric information on corporate cultures themselves
than with symmetric uncertainty concerning how these cultures will blend. For
instance, it appears unlikely that the owners of AOL and Time Warner were fully
13This essentially corresponds to the mechanism proposed by Cre´mer (1987) in a setting where
a ‘target’ firm with known outside option is up for sale to a number of potential acquirers whose
outside option is also known, but who possess private information concerning joint profits. Cre´mer
shows that—in contrast to a pure cash auction—the target can come arbitrarily close to full surplus
extraction by a contingent value auction such that the target receives essentially full residual claims
to the merged entity and buys out the winning bidder by a cash transfer.
14This corollary parallels Proposition 2 in Brusco et al. (2005), who fittingly use the term ‘ac-
quisition mechanisms’ for merger mechanisms of this type.
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unaware of differences in management style, dress policy or e-mail systems. Rather it
would seem that both parties underestimated the frictions involved in reconciling the
differences.15 Second, obviously, even when asymmetric information about corporate
culture is involved, this does not preclude the coexistence of private information
concerning other properties of the firms, rendering Proposition 3.1 irrelevant.
Finally, a weak point of the mechanism in Proposition 3.1 is that truth-telling
is only weakly optimal for the party whose stand-alone profits are known. This is
clearly an undesirable property, but not uncommon in related problems (see e.g.
Mezzetti, 2004). However, if both parties’ stand-alone profits are known (as in
Examples 1 and 2 above)—so private information concerns only merger profits πM—
then efficiency can be achieved by means of a mechanism satisfying (IC), (BB) and
(IR) for which truth-telling is strictly optimal. The simplest way to achieve this
is to split merger profits in proportion to firms’ (constant) stand-alone profits, so
that πˆMi (t˜; t) = [πi/(π1 + π2)] · πM(t). More generally, by complementary use of
transfers over M1, arbitrary divisions of merger profits are implementable along
with an efficient merger decision. As long as each agent receives a strictly positive
share, truth-telling will be strictly optimal for such mechanisms.
It is instructive to relate Proposition 3.1 to Myerson and Satterthwaite’s (1983)
well-known impossibility result. To this end, interpret our ‘merger environment’ as a
‘trade environment’ for the bilateral sale of some indivisible good, with m = 1 if trade
occurs. Interpret player 1 as buyer and player 2 as seller, with types ti corresponding
to valuations for the good. Let π1(t) ≡ 0 denote the buyer’s outside option, let
π2(t) = t2 denote the seller’s outside option, and let π
M(t) = t1 denote the buyer’s
utility in the event of trade. This reinterpretation of our model corresponds exactly
to the Myerson-Satterthwaite setting—the only difference being that the mechanism
now has the additional possibility of conditioning both agents’ payoffs on the effective
value of trade (i.e., on the buyer’s utility if trade occurs). By Proposition 3.1,
this possibility entirely reverses Myerson and Satterthwaite’s negative finding that
there exists no efficient Bayesian mechanism: Efficient trade is now implementable
under the much stronger requirements of ex-post incentive compatibility, ex-post
individual rationality, and budget balance.16 This is achieved by making the seller
residual claimant on the buyer’s utility in the event of trade—a mode of trade
which admittedly strains possibilities in a classical trade setting, but poses a natural
possibility in a merger context.
As we will show in the next section, however, this contingent-payment feature of
merger negotiations loses its power once both parties’ outside options are subject to
private information. Cast into the Myerson-Satterthwaite setting, this corresponds
15See Albarran and Gormly (2004) for an account of the AOL/Time Warner merger.
16In fact, Proposition 3.1 trivially applies to more general trade settings in which the seller’s
valuation π2(t) and the buyer’s valution πM(t) are arbitrary functions of t, thus allowing for the
possibility of common valuations for the good (i.e., the seller having information on the value of
the good to the buyer and vice versa).
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to situations in which the buyer’s utility if no trade occurs is subject to private
information.
4 Implementation with Unknown Outside Options
Contrasting Proposition 3.1, we will now show that, within the class of competitive
merger environments specified in Definition 2.7, not only is implementing the effi-
cient merger decision generally impossible, but that any kind of second-best solution
can only implement rather trivial merger decision functions.
The result uses several intuitive ingredients. These in turn derive separately
from (a) incentive constraints which inhibit misreports that have no impact on the
merger decision (relative to truth-telling), and from (b) incentive constraints which
inhibit misreports that alter the merger decision.
Essentially, the constraints in (a) imply that agents’ payoffs can be conditioned
only on observed outcomes, i.e. on π1 and π2 if no merger occurs, and on π
M if a
merger occurs, which means that information revealed by the agents can at best
be used to decide whether or not a merger takes place, but not to determine how
aggregate profits are to be split among the two parties. This is easily seen for type
profiles such that no merger takes place: If equilibrium transfers were dependent on
types over M0, some agent could necessarily increase his transfer by misreporting,
without reducing his stand-alone profit. For type profiles such that a merger takes
place, on the other hand, the result derives from two sources: First, selective pun-
ishment of a party which deviates from truth-telling is made impossible by the fact
that payoffs can be conditioned on true types only through πM . Second, collective
punishments for such inconsistent outcomes are precluded by (BB), which requires
that the full merger profits be distributed to the merging parties.
In turn, the constraints in (b), by which agents should neither want to induce
nor prevent a merger by misreporting, imply that for critical type profiles near
the boundary of the merger set, the stand-alone payoff (net of transfers) and the
payoff in case of a merger should be sufficiently close together, leading to a natural
continuity restriction. Moreover, the constraints imply an alignment between the
merger decision and agents’ private returns to merging.
For competitive merger environments, the combination of these restrictions pre-
cludes implementation of any but trivial merger decisions: In such environments,
agents’ stand-alone payoffs respond to private information in an inherently opposed
way, which—given the other restriction on equilibrium payoffs—makes it impossible
to achieve the required alignment between the merger decision and agents’ private
returns to merging.
In the following, we formally derive the described restrictions on the mechanism
in Sections 4.1–4.3. In Section 4.4, we then show how they dramatically reduce the
scope for implementation in competitive merger environments.
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4.1 Restrictions on the Mechanism over M 0
Local incentive constraints on the no-merger set immediately imply that transfers p0i
must be independent of player i’s report. The simple intuition for this is that over
M0 the returns to changing one’s report are independent of the true type profile
due to the additive separability of agents’ payoff functions in true and reported
types. Moreover, (BB) then immediately implies that each agent’s transfer must
also be independent of the other’s report. Taking these two arguments together,
transfer functions must be constant over connected subsets of M0. Moreover, it
is straightforward to see that requiring (IR) in addition immediately implies that
transfers are zero. The following lemma collects these results:
Lemma 4.1. For any mechanism satisfying (IC) and (BB),
(a) transfers p0i must be constant in reports over any open connected subset of M
0;
(b) p0i (t˜) = 0 for any t˜ ∈ M0 if (IR) is required in addition.
Cast in terms of restrictions on agents’ valuation functions Vi, (IC) and (BB)
thus imply by part (a) of Lemma 4.1 that for any agent i, over any open connected
subset of M0, Vi equals πi up to a constant. By part (b), imposing (IR) in addition
implies equality also in the constant term.
4.2 Restrictions on the Mechanism over M 1
Next, we show that restrictions imposed by (IC) and (BB) essentially imply con-
stance of value functions on level sets of the merger profit function over M1. As
mentioned already, the result rests on two key restrictions concerning the mecha-
nism’s response to deviations from truth-telling. First, as payoffs can be conditioned
on true types only through πM , outcomes which constitute an apparent deviation
from truth-telling cannot entail a selective punishment of the party responsible for
the deviation. Second, collective punishments for such inconsistent outcomes are
precluded by (BB), which requires that the full merger profits be distributed to
the merging parties, even if reports are inconsistent with the observed profits. The
following proposition formulates this intuitive idea somewhat more precisely.
Proposition 4.2. Any mechanism satisfying (IC) and (BB) must be such that, over
the interior of M1, each agent i’s value function Vi is constant on each connected
component of the intersection of any level set of πM and the interior of M1.
Graphically speaking, each agent’s value function Vi must thus be constant as
we move along any πM-level curve in M1. The remainder of Section 4.2 provides the
derivation of this Proposition.
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4.2.1 A Simple Case
Proposition 4.2 reflects a basic separation problem, which comes out most clearly
in the following special environment. Suppose that, unlike in the competitive en-
vironment, there are two profiles t′ = (t′i, t
′
j) and t
′′ = (t′′i , t
′
j) which differ only in
the type of agent i and which both induce a merger with the same level of merger
profits πM(t′) = πM(t′′). Then a merger mechanism that only conditions on true
types via merger profits cannot distinguish the outcome from truthfully reporting
t′′ from the outcome where agent i falsely reports t′′i . Thus, preventing such a false
report requires
Vi(t
′)  πˆMi
[
t′′i , t
′
j;π
M(t′)
]
= Vi(t
′′). (6)
By the same token Vi(t
′′)  Vi(t′). Hence, Vi(t′′) = Vi(t′), that is, agent i must
obtain the same equilibrium payoff for both profiles t′ and t′′.
4.2.2 Proving Proposition 4.2
The problem with the above restriction on value functions is not only that it applies
only to special environments. In addition, it exclusively concerns bundles that differ
only in one player’s type. Invoking (BB) in addition to (IC), however, we can arrive
at a result that applies also to type profiles t′ and t′′ which differ in both types.
Formally, this generalization consists in replacing the requirement that the profiles
differ only in one agent’s type with the much weaker requirement that both profiles
are in the merger set. To develop this result, we first extend condition (6) above to
this situation.
Lemma 4.3. Under any mechanism satisfying (IC) and (BB), for any i = j ∈ {1, 2}
and t′ ≡ (t′i, t′j), t′′ ≡ (t′′i , t′′j ) ∈ T such that πM(t′) = πM(t′′) and (t′′i , t′j) ∈ M1,
(a) Vi(t
′) + Vj(t′′)  πM(t′), and
(b) Vi(t
′)  Vi(t′′), if t′′ ∈ M1, in addition.
The proof is provided in the Appendix.
To understand this result, consider the visualization provided in Figure 2, and
let π˜M ≡ πM(t′) = πM(t′′). Now assume that the revelation game has resulted in
reports (t′′i , t
′
j) and merger profits of π˜
M. This outcome may either be the result of
agent i having provided a false report given types t′, or of agent j having provided
a false report given types t′′.17 Because the mechanism can condition payoffs only
on reports and observed merger profits, either situation must yield agents the same
payoff. Moreover, by (BB), agents’ payoffs must sum to π˜M. Incentive compatibility
(particularly, keeping i from reporting t′′i when true types are t
′ and agent j from
reporting t′j when true types are t
′′) then immediately leads to Lemma 4.3(a). If
17Generally, such an outcome may of course also result from both agents simultaneously deviating
from truth-telling. By the Nash-nature of ex-post incentive compatibility, however, only unilateral
deviations from truth-telling must be made unprofitable.
4 IMPLEMENTATION WITH UNKNOWN OUTSIDE OPTIONS 17
tit′′i t
′
i
tj
t′j
t′′j
t′
t′′
M1
πMconst.
Figure 2: Illustration of Lemma 4.3 and Lemma 4.4.
t′′ ∈ M1 in addition, then payoffs from truthful reporting in t′′ must sum to πM(t′)
as well. Thus, whatever agent j gets less from unilaterally misreporting t′j when true
types are t′′, agent j gets more, implying that agent i’s payoff for reports (t′′i , t
′
j) and
true types t′′ must be at least Vi(t′′), which produces part (b).
The next result is an immediate implication of Lemma 4.3 in situations where
t′, t′′, (t′′1, t
′
2) and t
′
1, t
′′
2) all lie in M
1:
Lemma 4.4. Under any mechanism satisfying (IC) and (BB), for any t′ = (t′1, t
′
2)
and t′′ = (t′′1, t
′′
2) such that (i) π
M(t′) = πM(t′′) and (ii) t′, t′′, (t′′1, t
′
2), (t
′
1, t
′′
2) ∈ M1,
we must have Vi(t
′) = Vi(t′′), i = 1, 2.
This result extends the simple case of Section 4.2.1 to situations where both
agents’ types differ. Finally, Proposition 4.2, stated above, follows from iterated
application of Lemma 4.4.18
4.3 Restrictions at the Boundary between M 0 and M 1
We now turn to deviations that affect the merger decision. We show that, to prevent
such decisions, the mechanism must guarantee that (i) valuation functions are con-
tinuous at the boundary of the merger region and (ii) private incentives are aligned
with the goals implicit in the merger decision.
To develop these results, we introduce the following terminology:
Definition 4.5. Agent i’s type is locally pivotal to the merger decision m at t =
(t1, t2) ∈ T if and only if, for any ε > 0, there exists a t′i with |ti − t′i| < ε such that
m(t′) = m(t).
At any point on the boundary, at least one agent’s type is locally pivotal. Graph-
ically, any parts of the boundary over which only agent i’s type is locally pivotal
will be perpendicular to the ti-axis (i.e., either horizontal or vertical).
18For any two points t′, t′′ connected by a πM level-curve lying in in the interior of M1, a
sequence of type profiles t1, . . . , tn can be found such that Lemma 4.4 is pairwise applicable to
(t′, t1), (t1, t2), . . . , (tn−1, tn), (tn, t′′), implying Vi(t′) = Vi(t′′), i = 1, 2.
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The two key restrictions to be developed in this section are (i) a continuity-
property concerning agents’ valuation functions across the merger boundary, and
(ii) a condition ensuring that the change in the merger decision at the boundary is
aligned with agents’ fundamental preferences.
4.3.1 A Simple Case
As in Section 4.2, it is instructive to first develop a weaker version of these results
in a simpler setting.
Proposition 4.6. For any merger mechanism satisfying (IC), let tˆ = (tˆ1, tˆ2) denote
any interior type profile such that some agent i’s type is locally pivotal. Then, if πM
is constant in ti over some neighborhood of tˆ, the following must hold:
(i) Vi is continuous in ti at tˆ;
(ii) πi is weakly decreasing (increasing) in ti at tˆ if m is increasing (decreasing).
To see (i), first note the following implication of the assumed local constance
of πM in ti together with Lemma 4.1 and Proposition 4.2: There are constants
V˜i and p˜
0
i , such that, for truthful reports tj, for j = i, agents of type ti earn V˜i
for arbitrary reports near tˆi that lead to a merger and πi(ti, tj) − p˜0i for arbitrary
reports near tˆi that do not. Types ti such that truthful reporting leads to a merger
will therefore misreport their type to prevent the merger unless V˜i  πi(ti, tj)− p˜0i .
Similarly, types ti such that truthful reporting leads to no merger will therefore
misreport their type to induce a merger unless πi(ti, tj)−p˜0i  πˆi[(t˜i, tj);πM(ti, tj)] =
πˆi[(t˜i, tj);π
M(t˜i, tj)] = V˜i, where we have used the presumption that π
M is locally
constant in ti; by continuity therefore πi(tˆi, tj)− p˜0i  V˜i.
Part (ii) is a simple implication of the more general concept of ‘Positive Asso-
ciation of Differences’ (PAD) property (see Roberts, 1979): If a change in agent i’s
signal from ti to t
′
i makes some alternative A relatively more profitable than some
other alternative B (gross of transfers), then an incentive compatible mechanism
must respect this by not choosing A at signal ti and B at signal t
′
i.
4.3.2 A More General Result
Again, Proposition 4.6 in itself is of limited value as it requires merger profits to be
locally independent of some agent i’s type. To understand the problems involved in
its generalization, note that if, say, πM were strictly increasing in ti instead, then
the payoff πˆMi [t˜i;π
M(ti)] obtained by a type ti ∈ (tˆi, 1] from reporting t˜i ∈ [0, tˆi) so
as to prevent the merger no longer relates to any of the incentive constraints for
types ti ∈ [0, tˆi) since those types’ payoffs will all be conditioned on other levels of
merger profits πM.
However, as above, a generalization can be obtained by instead appealing to
(BB) to link these incentive constraints to incentive constraints faced by the other
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agent for type profiles which involve the same merger profits πM. This leads to a
continuity requirement which, instead, holds on πM-level curves:
Proposition 4.6’. Suppose πM is strictly monotone in both types. Then, under
any mechanism satisfying (IC) and (BB), at any point tˆ on any smooth part of the
boundary, the following must hold:
(a) If agent i’s type is locally pivotal at tˆ, then
(ai) Vi must be continuous at tˆ along the level curve of π
M through tˆ;
(aii) πi must be weakly increasing in the direction of the π
M-level curve through
tˆ in which m is decreasing;
(b) π1 and π2 must be constant on any connected subset of the boundary along
which πM is constant.
See the Appendix for the proof.
Part (a) extends the two insights from the simple case.19,20 As described, it de-
rives from combining agents’ incentive constraints for different type profiles yielding
the same merger payoffs, therefore producing a continuity requirement which holds
on πM-level curves. Part (b) can be understood as an extension of (aii) to a special
case: If the merger boundary locally coincides with a level curve of πM, then both
agents’ types will be locally pivotal, but the merger decision function m will generally
be constant along this πM-level curve. As part (b) shows, valuation functions must
in this case also be constant along the relevant πM-level curve (by the continuity-
property (ai) and by transfers being constant over M0, valuation functions being
constant is equivalent to stand-alone profits being constant).
Proposition 4.6’ has far-reaching consequences concerning the potential locations
of merger boundaries in type space. To see this, simply note that at points where
continuity in both agents’ value functions Vi is required, their sum must be continuous
as well. Since V1 + V2 ≡ πM over M1 and V1 + V2 ≡ π1 + π2 over M0 by (BB), this
can only be the case at points t where πM(t) = π1(t) + π2(t) (i.e., on the boundary
of the efficient merger set). Moreover, the required alignment of the merger decision
with individual preferences immediately translates into an alignment of the merger
decision with social objectives:
19The statements in Proposition 4.6’ are restricted to smooth parts of the boundary to make the
proof less tedious. This will be sufficient for our purposes, however, given that we have assumed
the boundary to be almost everywhere smooth.
20Note that by Proposition 4.6, Proposition 4.6’(a) trivially extends also to merger environments
where πM is constant in both types. It runs into limitations, however, if πM depends on one agent’s
type alone. To understand why, note that the underlying argument relies on the observed outcome
of the unilateral deviation by agent i being replicable by some unilateral deviation on behalf of the
other agent j from some other type profile, which is not possible if πM depends on ti alone. In that
case, punishing agent i’s deviation leads to no conflict with any of agent j’s incentive constraints.
Continuity need therefore no longer hold for this agent’s value function.
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Figure 3: An L-Shaped Merger Decision Function.
Corollary 4.7. Under the prerequisites of Proposition 4.6’, any smooth parts of the
boundary at which both agents’ types are locally pivotal must be contained in the set
{t ∈ T | πM(t) = π1(t) + π2(t)}. Moreover, at any such boundary point, m must be
decreasing in any direction in which πM − π1 − π2 is strictly decreasing.
See the Appendix for the proof.
Somewhat loosely speaking, except for horizontal or vertical parts of the bound-
ary and parts where the boundary is not smooth, the boundaries of implementable
merger decision functions must therefore be efficient in a local sense.
4.4 Implementation in a Competitive Merger Environment
Building on our previous results, we now argue that, within the class of competitive
merger environments (see Definition 2.7), only merger decisions of a rather trivial
nature can be implemented. Coarsely speaking, it is hard to avoid ex-post regret
because parties fundamentally disagree about the circumstances in which they find
staying alone attractive. More specifically, local changes in type profiles which leave
joint merger profits constant will always decrease one agent’s stand-alone profits.
Given the constraints derived above, this precludes any merger decision which, for
some type profile prescribing a merger, simultaneously gives both agents the possi-
bility to inhibit the merger by a unilaterally false report.
To develop this result formally, we introduce the following definition:
Definition 4.8. A merger decision function m is L-shaped if, for some tˆ = (tˆ1, tˆ2) ∈
T and any t = (t1, t2) ∈ T, it satisfies
m(t) =
{
0, t1 > tˆ1 and t2 > tˆ2,
1, t1 < tˆ1 or t2 < tˆ2.
(7)
Figure 3 provides an illustration of an L-shaped merger decision function. Degen-
erate cases of an L-shaped merger decision function include mergers never occurring
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if tˆ = (0, 0), mergers always occurring if tˆ = (1, 1), and the merger decision globally
depending on only one agent’s report if tˆ1 = 0 or tˆ2 = 0.
The characteristic features of an L-shaped merger decision function are the fol-
lowing: (i) the merger decision is non-increasing in each type (as required for com-
petitive merger environments by Proposition 4.6’(aii)), and (ii) at each type profile
in M1, at most one agent can inhibit the merger by a false report. As the next result
shows, any other merger decision function is not implementable under (BB):
Proposition 4.9. In any competitive merger environment, under (BB), any merger
decision function which is not L-shaped is not implementable.
See the Appendix for the proof.
The intuition for Proposition 4.9 essentially combines two insights: First, it is
easily seen that competitive merger environments have the property that players’
stand-alone profits always decrease in different directions along any πM-level curve.
Second, however, aligning both players’ private interests with the merger decision
function requires both players’ stand-alone profits to be locally decreasing along the
πM-level curve wherever the merger decision is increasing (see Proposition 4.6’(b)).
This leaves only merger decision functions which are L-shaped as candidates for
implementation—these decision functions being the only ones which require align-
ment of only one player’s interests with the decision function at any boundary
point.21
If we add (IR) to the requirements of Proposition 4.9, this immediately implies
that πM(t)  π1(t) + π2(t) for all t ∈ M1: If joint merger profits are lower than
aggregate stand-alone payoffs, at least one agent must necessarily lose from the
merger.22 Combined with Proposition 4.9, the following result is immediate:
Corollary 4.10. Unless a competitive merger environment is such that some agent
i’s type being low enough is a sufficient indicator that a merger is efficient, only
21Conversely, however, L-shapedness is not a sufficient property to guarantee implementability
of a merger decision function under (BB). However, it is easily shown that a weaker version holds:
L-shaped merger decision functions for which tˆi = 0 for some i ∈ {1, 2} are always implementable
under (BB). These are degenerate instances of L-shaped merger decision functions, however, as
at least one agent’s report will be altogether irrelevant to the merger decision. More generally,
it can be shown that an L-shaped merger decision function with vertex tˆ = (tˆ1, tˆ2), tˆ1, tˆ2 > 0, is
implementable under (BB) if and only if for any t′, t′′ ∈ M1 such that (i) πM(t′) = πM(t′′), and
(ii) t′1 = tˆ1 and t
′′
2 = tˆ2, it holds that π
M(t′)  max
{
π1(t′) + π2(t′′), π1(t′′) + π2(t′)
}
.
22There is another argument in favor of a priori focussing attention to mechanisms which sat-
isfy this latter condition, based on a renegotiation-proofness argument: Any time a mechanism
produces an inefficient merger decision and parties have somehow revealed their type through the
mechanism, there is ample scope for renegotiation. The applicability of any inefficient mechanism
therefore relies crucially on the mechanism operator’s ability to commit. However, standard rep-
utation arguments to justify the credibility of such a commitment are likely to fail in the merger
context, where the problem to be solved by the mechanism is of an inherent one-shot nature.
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trivial decision of the type ‘never merge’ are implementable if the mechanism is to
satisfy (IR) in addition to (BB).23
Thus, in a wide class of competitive merger environments (including Examples 3
and 4 above), a merger mechanism satisfying (BB) and (IR) can achieve no more
than reproduce the status quo.
It is important to note that our definition of a competitive merger environment
includes the degenerate case that firms’ stand-alone profits are independent of the
other firm’s type (condition (ii) of Definition 2.7 holds with equality). Thus, the
negative results of this section also hold in this seemingly simpler case.
5 Relaxing Budget Balance
Our discussion in Section 4 has pointed out two important ingredients to the impossi-
bility result developed there: First , that the mechanism typically cannot distinguish
unilateral deviations by an agent over M1 from deviations by the other, which pre-
cludes a selective punishment for deviations from truth-telling. Second , since (BB)
requires budget balance also off-equilibrium, a collective punishment for outcomes
which constitute an apparent deviation on some parties’ behalf are also precluded.
This section picks up on the latter point by showing that the possibility of
“burning money” off-equilibrium indeed makes efficient implementation possible in
a large class of environments. To this end, we replace (BB), the budget balance
concept used hitherto, with the following, weaker concept:
Definition 5.1. A merger mechanism satisfies equilibrium budget balance (EBB) if,
for all t ∈ T,
V1(t) + V2(t) =
{
π1(t) + π2(t), if t ∈ M0,
πM(t), if t ∈ M1. (8)
In contrast to (BB), (EBB) allows the budget to be broken off equilibrium, that is,
when agents misreport their types. This paves the way for efficient implementation
in a large class of environments:
23We should point out, however, that adding the requirement πM(t)  π1(t) + π2(t) for all
t ∈ M1 to the conditions imposed on m in Proposition 4.9 is not sufficient to ensure that m is
implementable under (IC), (IR) and (BB). This has to do with the fact that, whereas equilibrium
utilities Vi must be constant along πM-level curves in M1, the outside options π1 and π2 will
vary. More specifically, for any m described in Proposition 4.9 and any attainable level of merger
profits π˜M, let A(π˜M) ≡ {t ∈ M1 | πM(t) = π˜M} denote the intersection of the corresponding
level curve with M1, and let V˜1(π˜M), V˜2(π˜M) denote the (by Proposition 4.2 constant) equilibrium
utility levels on A(π˜M). Then (IR) requires V˜i  maxt∈A(π˜M) πi(t), i = 1, 2, and hence π˜M 
maxt∈A(π˜M) π1(t)+maxt∈A(π˜M) π2(t). It is quickly checked that this results in an upward boundary
on tˆi (intuitively, so that π1 and π2’s variability over M1 is limited).
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Proposition 5.2. In any merger environment where πM is strictly monotone in
each type, any efficient merger decision can be implemented by a merger mechanism
satisfying (IC), (IR), and (EBB).
The formal proof, provided in the Appendix, confirms the obvious intuition that
imposing a sufficiently harsh collective punishment for any outcomes involving incon-
sistencies in reports and realized profits will permit implementation of the efficient
merger decision with essentially arbitrary profit-sharing rules.24,25
Proposition 5.2’s scope is of course limited by the extent to which “off-equilibrium
money burning” poses a realistic possibility in merger negotiations. Depending on
the merger environment, the amount of wealth destroyed can be severe, and absent
an adequate commitment device, parties will have strong incentives to renege on
such outcomes. On the other hand, given that possibilities are very limited without
money burning by our results in Section 4, parties should have a strong interest to
find a device which enforces such punishments.
6 Conclusion
This paper has shown that the potential for implementing merger decisions which
avoid ex-post regret depends in an important way on the information concerning
players’ outside options. If at least one player’s outside option is subject to neither
party’s private information, then efficient implementation is possible by means of a
simple buyout of this player by the other party. When private information concerns
both party’s outside options, however, the scope for regret-free implementation of
any non-trivial merger decisions is extremely limited, at least as long as budget
balance is required also off equilibrium. Restricting the budget-balance requirement
24Indeed, in keeping with this intuition, the mechanism employed in the proof of Proposition 5.2
employs a sufficiently large uniform punishment αi for any merger outcome involving reports
that are incompatible with observed profits (requirement (b) in the proof). However, a more
differentiated punishment can reduce the extent of “off-equilibrium money-burning”. To see this,
note that for any possible off-equilibrium merger outcome consisting of reports t˜ = (t˜1, t˜2) and
observed profits πM = πM(t˜), the assumed monotonicity of πM implies that there exists at most
one tˆi ∈ Ti such that πM(tˆi, t˜j) = πM, that is, such that the observed outcome is attainable
by agent i unilaterally deviating from truthful reporting. If such a tˆi exists, (IC) can thus be
ensured by setting πˆMi (t˜, π
M) = πi(tˆi, t˜j) for any such outcome (which constitutes the maximal
off-equilibrium payoff which ensures (IC), i.e. the minimal extent of “money burning”); if no such
tˆi exists, πˆMi (t˜, π
M) may be set arbitrarily for this outcome.
25The monotonicity requirement in Proposition 5.2 is related to the separation problem discussed
in Section 4.2.1, which arises even in the absence of off-equilibrium budget balance when πM is
not monotone. To understand this, suppose there exist t′ = (t′i, t
′
j) and t
′′ = (t′′i , t
′′
j ) with t
′
j = t
′′
j ,
t′i = t′′i , t′, t′′ ∈ M1 and πM(t′) = πM(t′′). Then (IC) requires Vi(t′) = Vi(t′′). This additional
restriction will generally prohibit choosing πˆM such that V1(t)  π1(t) and V2(t)  π2(t) for
t = t′, t′′—at least so long as π1(t′) = π1(t′′) and π2(t′) = π2(t′′). Moreover, preventing false
reports which lead to inefficient mergers requires that Vi(t′′)  πi(t′) for any t′ ∈ M0 and t′′ ∈ M1
(the rest as above), which collides with Vi(t′′)  πi(t′′) whenever πi(t′)  πi(t′′).
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to hold only under truth-telling, however, restores efficient implementation quite
generally, but requires a third-party intermediary appropriating parties’ wealth in
off-equilibrium outcomes. In sum, these findings indicate that in a wide range of sit-
uations, mergers under asymmetric information necessarily involve an idiosyncratic
gamble.
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Figure A.1: Illustrations Accompanying Proof of Proposition 4.6’.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4.3. (a) To keep agent i from reporting t′′i when true types are t
′ (and
agent j reports truthfully), (IC) requires
Vi(t′)  πˆMi [t′′i , t′j ;πM(t′)]. (A.1)
Similarly, to keep agent j from reporting t′j when true types are t
′′ (and agent i reports
truthfully),
Vj(t′′)  πˆMj [t′j , t′′i ;πM(t′′)]. (A.2)
Since πM(t′) = πM(t′′) by presumption, the right-hand sides of (A.1) and (A.2) sum to
πM(t′′) by (BB), which proves the claim.
(b) If t′′ ∈ M1, then Vj(t′′) + Vi(t′′) = πM(t′′) by (BB). Since the right-hand sides of
(A.1) and (A.2) add to πM(t′′) as well, (A.2) may be rewritten as Vi(t′′)  πMi [t′′i , t′j ;πM(t′)],
which together with (A.1) implies part (b).
Proof of Proposition 4.6’. Without loss of generality, we let πM be strictly increasing in
both types, so that the πM-level curves are downward-sloping in t1/t2-space.26 Further,
due to symmetry, it suffices to prove the claim for agent 1.
Case A: Suppose first that the πM-level curve and boundary intersect at tˆ and that
the boundary has a non-negative slope, as illustrated in Figure A.1(a). Then, any neigh-
borhood of tˆ will contain t′ ∈ M0, t′′ ∈ M1 such that (i) πM(t′) = πM(t′′) = πM(tˆ),
(ii) (t′′1, t′2) ∈ M1.27 Moreover, for any sufficiently small neighborhood of tˆ, V1 will be
constant on the part of the πM-level curve lying in M1 by Proposition 4.2, and p01 will
be constant over M0 by Lemma 4.1(a).28 Restricting attention to such sufficiently small
26The other cases are obtained by a simple re-normalization of agents’ type spaces.
27While Figure A.1(a) illustrates this for a merger decision function which is locally decreasing
in agent 1’s type, this is quickly seen to be true also in the locally decreasing case.
28Larger neighborhoods might, for instance, contain parts of the level curve that belong to
different connected components of the intersection with the interior of M1.
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neighborhoods of tˆ and denoting these values by V˜ 11 and p˜
0
1, respectively, Lemma 4.3(b)
immediately implies π1(t′)− p˜01  V˜ 11 . Continuity of π1 thus implies
π1(tˆ)− p˜01  V˜ 11 . (A.3)
Moreover, any such neighborhood of tˆ will contain a t ∈ M1 with πM(t) = πM(tˆ) such
that agent 1 can inhibit the merger and obtain a payoff of π1(t)−p˜01 (such as type profile t′′
in Figure A.1(a)), implying V˜1  π1(t)− p˜01, and therefore
V˜1  π1(tˆ)− p˜01. (A.4)
(A.3) and (A.4) imply part (ai).
To see that part (aii) holds in this scenario, assume to the contrary that π1 is strictly
decreasing at tˆ in the direction along the part of the πM-level curve running into M0.
Then, given the constance of V1 over the part of the level curve lying in M1 and the proven
continuity result, there necessarily exist t′ ∈ M0, t′′ ∈ M1 with the same properties as
above and such that π1(t′) − p˜01 < V˜ 11 , in contradiction to Lemma 4.3(b). Note that the
above arguments carry through also if agent 2’s report is not locally pivotal (i.e., if the
boundary in Figure A.1(a) is vertical).
Case B: Next, consider a point of intersection tˆ where the boundary has a strictly
negative slope, as in Figure A.1(b). Any neighborhood of tˆ will now contain t′, t′′ ∈ M0
such that (i) πM(t′) = πM(t′′) = πM(tˆ) and (ii) either (t′′1, t′2) ∈ M1 or (t′1, t′′2) ∈ M1.
Then Lemma 4.3(a) implies π1(t′) + π2(t′′)  πM(t′). Again, since this is true of any
sufficiently small neighborhood of tˆ and profit functions are continuous, it follows that
π1(tˆ) + π2(tˆ)  πM(tˆ). On the other hand, for any t ∈ M1 sufficiently close to tˆ and such
that πM(t) = πM(tˆ) (such as t′′′ in Figure A.1(b)), either agent can inhibit the merger
decision. Again restricting attention to small enough neighborhoods to let us use the
notation V˜ 1i and p˜
0
i employed above, incentive compatibility requires that for any such t
and any i ∈ {1, 2},
V˜i  πi(t)− p˜0i . (A.5)
Therefore, summing the two incentive constraints, πM(tˆ)  π1(t)+π2(t). Hence, πM(tˆ) 
π1(tˆ)+π2(tˆ), which, combined with our above result, immediately implies πM(tˆ) = π1(tˆ)+
π2(tˆ). Thus, V1 + V2 is continuous along the πM-level curve.
By a limit argument, (A.5) must apply also at t = tˆ. However, given that πM(tˆ) =
π1(tˆ) + π2(tˆ), this condition can be met for both i ∈ {1, 2} only if both conditions bind,
which implies continuity of each Vi along the πM-level curve. Proving part (aii) is straight-
forward by an argument as in Case A.
Case C: It thus remains to consider boundary points where boundary and πM-level
curve are tangent. Using a similar argument as in Case B, πM(tˆ) = π1(tˆ) + π2(tˆ) at such
a tangency point: Any neighborhood of tˆ contains t′, t′′ ∈ M0 such that πM(t′) = πM(t′′)
and such that (t′′1, t′2) ∈ M1, implying πM(tˆ)  π1(tˆ) + π2(tˆ) by Lemma 4.3(a) and a
simple limit argument. Moreover, any neighborhood of t contains a t ∈ M1 such that
either agent can inhibit the merger with a unilateral misreport, implying by (BB) that
πM(tˆ)  π1(tˆ) + π2(tˆ).
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Now let (tn) denote any infinite sequence in M1 which converges to tˆ. Then, for n large
enough (so that either agent can inhibit the merger), incentive compatibility combined
with (BB) implies
π1(tn)− p˜01  V1(tn)  πM(tn)− π2(tn)− p˜01. (A.6)
As n → ∞, the left- and right-hand sides of (A.6) converge to π1(tˆ) − p˜01 since πM(tˆ) =
π1(tˆ) + π2(tˆ) by our previous argument. Thus, V1 is continuous at tˆ, which completes the
proof of part (a).
To prove part (b), simply note that for any two tangency points tˆ and tˆ′ lying in
a connected subset of the boundary on which πM is constant, Vˆ 11 (tˆ) = Vˆ
1
1 (tˆ
′): For any
sequence (tn) in M1 converging to tˆ, we can find a sequence (t′n) in M1 which converges to
tˆ′ such that πM(tn) = πM(t′n) for every n and hence, by the constance of value functions
over πM level sets in M1, V1(tn) = V1(t′n) for every n. Since Vˆ 11 (tˆ) = π1(tˆ) − p˜01 and
Vˆ 11 (tˆ
′) = π1(tˆ′) − p˜01, this immediately delivers π1(tˆ) = π1(tˆ′), as claimed. π2(tˆ) = π2(tˆ′)
follows by symmetry.
Proof of Corollary 4.7. The argument proving the first part of Corollary 4.7 is provided
in the text. To see the second part, suppose to the contrary that there exists some
direction in which πM − π1 − π2 is strictly decreasing but m is increasing at tˆ. Then, any
neighborhood of tˆ will contain a t ∈ M1 such that πM(t) < π1(t) + π2(t) and such that
both agents can inhibit the merger with some false report contained in this neighborhood.
For sufficiently small neighborhoods, transfers are constant over M0 in this neighborhood.
Denoting these values by p˜0i , incentive compatibility requires Vi(t)  πi(t)− p˜0i and hence,
by (BB), V1(t) + V2(t)  π1(t) + π2(t)—a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4.9. Step 1: Combining Proposition 4.6’(ai) with the properties of
competitive merger environments, it is immediately obvious that any smooth parts of the
boundary must be either horizontal or vertical (see the argument in the main text). Thus,
the merger boundary can consist only of combinations of horizontal and vertical segments.
Step 2: The next result restricts these cases further, leaving only the merger decision
functions described in the proposition as potential candidates for implementation:
Lemma A.1. In any competitive merger environment, any merger mechanism satisfying
(IC) and (BB) must be such that,
(a) at any smooth part of the merger boundary where only agent i’s type is locally pivotal,
the merger decision function m must be decreasing in t˜i;
(b) the merger decision function exhibits no t ∈ M1 such that both agents have the
possibility of inhibiting the merger with some unilateral misreport.
Part (a) is an immediate consequence of Proposition 4.6’(aii): By the properties of
competitive merger environments, πi is strictly increasing on any πM-level curve in the
direction in which ti is increasing, so that m must be decreasing in that direction.
To see part (b), observe first that, given step 1 of the argument, a merger set M1
containing type profiles t such that both agents have the possibility of inhibiting the
merger must (at least over some subset of type space) look as depicted in Figure A.2:
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Figure A.2: Illustration Accompanying Proof of Proposition 4.9.
an inverted L-shape with vertex tˆ = (tˆ1, tˆ2), where mergers occur if t˜1 < tˆ1 and t˜2 < tˆ2,
and where no mergers occur if either t˜1 > tˆ1 or t˜2 > tˆ2. To see that such a merger
decision function cannot be implementable, observe first that, as shown in the figure, any
neighborhood of tˆ will contain t′, t′′ ∈ M0 lying on opposite sides of the πM-level curve
through tˆ such that (t′′1, t′2) ∈ M1. Lemma 4.3(b) then implies πM(tˆ)  π1(t′) + π2(t′′),
and hence, by a simple limit argument,
πM(tˆ)  π1(tˆ) + π2(tˆ). (A.7)
Moreover, as illustrated in Figure A.2, there exist tA, tB on the boundary such that tA1 =
tˆ1, tA2 < tˆ2, t
B
2 = tˆ2, t
B
1 < tˆ1, π
M(tA) = πM(tB), and such that, by Proposition 4.2,
value functions are constant on the πM-level curve between tA and tB. Denoting the
latter values by V˜1 and V˜2, respectively, incentive compatibility for agent 1 at t′ requires
V˜1  π1(tA)− p˜01, whereas at tB, it requires V˜2  π2(tB)− p˜02 for agent 2.29 Thus,
V˜1 + V˜2  π1(tA) + π2(tB). (A.8)
But for competitive merger environments, π1(tA)  π1(tˆ) and π2(tB)  π2(tˆ) and V˜1+V˜2 <
πM(tˆ) (due to πM being increasing in both types and because of (BB)), implying
πM(tˆ) > π1(tˆ) + π2(tˆ), (A.9)
which contradicts (A.7) and thereby completes the proof of Lemma A.1.
Finally, given steps 1 and 2, only L-shaped merger decisions are left as possible candi-
dates for implementation, which concludes the proof of Proposition 4.9.
Proof of Proposition 5.2. Choose the merger mechanism (m, πˆM, p0i ) such that m is effi-
cient, and such that
(a) p0i (t˜) = 0 for t˜ ∈ M0;
(b) πˆMi (t˜, π
M) ≡ αi, i = 1, 2, for all t˜, πM such that πM(t˜) = πM, where αi is a real
number such that αi < inft∈T πi(t);
29In the by now familiar fashion, we restrict attention to sufficiently small neighborhoods of tˆ
such that p0i (t) = p˜
0
i for all t ∈ M0 over this neighborhood. Moreover, note that strictly speaking,
the above incentive constraints obtain directly only if the boundary points tA, tB are contained in
M1. However, if this is not the case, the same restrictions obtain by a simple limit argument.
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(c) for t˜ and πM such that πM(t˜) = πM, πˆMi satisfies
(c1) πˆMi (t˜, π
M)  πi(t˜) for i = 1, 2, and
(c2) πˆM1 (t˜, π
M) + πˆM2 (t˜, π
M) = πM(t˜) (= πM).
That is: a no-merger outcome involves no transfers by (a), type reports incompatible with
observed profits under a merger entail sufficiently harsh punishments for both parties
by (b), whereas equilibrium payoffs under a merger exceed standalone-profits for both
parties by (c1) and add up to joint merger profits by (c2). Note that requirements (c1) and
(c2) can jointly be met if the merger decision is efficient (more generally, if M1 ⊆ M1∗).30
By requirements (a) and (c1), the mechanism satisfies (IR). (EBB) is trivially implied
by (a) and (c2). As to (IC), consider first any t′ = (t′i, t
′
j) ∈ M0 and consider i’s incentives
to report any t′′i = t′i, leading to reports t′′ ≡ (t′′i , t′j). Since p0i is constant in reports by
requirement (a), such a deviation can only be profitable if t′′ ∈ M1, that is, if it induces a
merger. By requirement (b), however, this can only be profitable if πM(t′) = πM(t′′) (i.e.,
if the false report is compatible with realized merger profits), which in turn is precluded
by joint merger profits πM being strictly monotone in both types.
Next, consider truthful reports t′ ∈ M1 and any unilateral deviation by agent i leading
to reports t′′. Since Vi(t′) = πˆMi [t
′, πM(t′)]  πi(t′) by (c1) and p0i (t′′) = 0 by (a), any such
deviation involving t′′ ∈ M0 cannot be profitable. For t′′ ∈ M1 such that πM(t′) = πM(t′′),
requirements (b) and (c1) together imply Vi(t′)  πˆM[t′′, πM(t′)]. A profitable deviation
would thus need to involve πM(t′) = πM(t′′), which is again precluded by πM being strictly
monotone in both types.
30Also, note that the surplus generated by the merger may be split in any way.
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